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Abstract 
Shell CO2 Storage B.V. (SCS) is planning for the injection of some 10 million tonnes of CO2 in 
two depleted gas fields Barendrecht (BRT) and Barendrecht–Ziedewij (BRTZ). The project will 
be the first Dutch onshore injection project and can be regarded as a demonstration project to 
show that a framework is in place before implementing larger future sequestration projects. The 
primary focus of the subsurface study was to demonstrate containment of the CO2. A safety 
management plan on possible leakage from the containment was written, which documents 
possible physical and chemical threats, various barriers that are in place, probability and impact 
of leakage scenarios and a monitoring, prevention and response plan. It is demonstrated that no 
medium and high risk leakage scenarios have been identified in both the injection phase and post 
abandonment phase. Mitigating actions lead to a reduction of the “low” risk scenarios to a 
“negligible” status. 
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1. Introduction 
Risks and uncertainties are frequently being quantified using a quantitative risk assessment (QRA) approach. The 
standard safety QRA describes the possible risk scenarios that ultimately lead to lethal consequences. In general, a 
QRA is only needed when a risk scenario with possible health, safety and environmental (HSE) consequences can 
be defined. The first principle of containment demonstration is therefore the assessment of possible migration and 
leakage scenarios that results in HSE consequences. Therefore, we developed a dedicated step-based risk assessment 
and risk management approach for the Barendrecht (BRT) and Barendrecht-Ziedewij (BRTZ) proposed storage of 
CO2 to demonstrate subsurface containment in the subsurface.  
Together with the Netherlands Institute of Applied Research, TNO, we performed an investigation to the 
potential leakage scenarios. A quantitative calculation (the amount of leaked CO2 and the possible consequence) is 
then only needed for those scenarios where a non-negligible safety risk can be identified. These observations formed 
the basis of this approach, which is consistent with approaches recently published in [ 1 ] and [ 2 ]. 
2. Project risks versus ‘leakage’ risks 
Any industrial project will face certain risks like financial and HSE risks. In the case of possible CO2 leakage we 
mostly refer to HSE risks but the ultimate impact of higher concentrations of CO2 on health and environment is a 
topic of much debate. For the Barendrecht project the aim is to demonstrate containment in the subsurface making 
further discussions on impact from possible subsurface leakage obsolete. To avoid a discussion on what the 
definition is of the subsurface “container” we will discriminate here between the terms leakage and migration of 
CO2. Migration means escaped CO2 from the storage reservoir but moving or trapped within the subsurface. 
Leakage is migrated CO2 that leaks into the biosphere. The risk scenarios explained in this paper are called leakage 
scenarios because the aim of the risk management plan is an assessment on the possible escape of CO2 into the 
biosphere.  
The identification and description of leakage scenarios are especially important in ‘new’ applications of CO2 
injection. Once identified, a quantitative estimate of the consequence of the leak scenario (the amount of leaked CO2 
and the possible consequence) can be calculated but this in only needed for those scenarios where a health, safety, 
environmental or economical risk can be identified.  
A life cycle framework is adopted for the project that is not very different from a ‘standard’ oil- and gas project 
framework except for the fact that geological containment is the main driver for the project rather than production.  
To structure the risk management process it was decided to follow a step-based approach. The steps presented in this 
abstract summarize the step-based approach that is fully documented in [ 4 ]. The approach agrees with standards as 
proposed by ISO/FDIS 31000:2900 [ 5 ]. A description of these steps is presented below. 
 
Step 1: site selection from the available fields  
This step evaluates the possible fields that are available for CO2 sequestration. Site selection is also a common first 
step in the literature on CO2 sequestration risk management. Lists of risk factors have been documented (e.g. [ 6 ]) 
that facilitates the choice of the correct candidate.  The reality however is that in many cases only a few candidate 
fields are timely available after the first assessment. Besides containment risk factors or threats also other critical 
factors like economical factors (e.g. distance to source) and legal issues control the selection of a specific site. 
Furthermore, not only subsurface threats need to be addressed but also surface risk factors coming from, for 
example, CO2 transport need to be incorporated in the field selection phase. Finally, a governmental tender 
procedure prescribed that only onshore fields could be selected. The primary field that was chosen was the ‘de Lier 
field’ but, based on the feasibility studies. This field was rejected because of low to medium leakage risks by those 
abandoned wells that could not be accessed anymore under the conditions  of stored CO2 just below initial 
reservoir pressure. The second candidate having a fair distance to the CO2 source (Pernis refinery) and the correct 
storage capacity was the combination of the BRT and BRTZ fields. 
 
Step 2: Inventory of relevant threats and leakage scenarios. 
A brainstorm session was held with internal and external experts. It was also tried during this session to identify the 
threats that form cause-consequences relations. Cause-consequence relations could hence be placed into a scenario 
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like for instance the well leakage scenario. TNO’s FEP database [ 7 ] has been used to facilitate this first assessment 
and was also used as check whether threats were overlooked during the brainstorm session. The selected FEPs or 
threats have been visualized in a relational (cause-consequence) bow-tie diagram (see step 4 for further explanation). 
These threats form the basis for the feasibility study or threat assessment.  
 
Step 3: Feasibility study and threat assessment 
A series of technical studies have been defined based on the threats and leakage scenarios that were identified in 
step 2. These studies result in a detailed assessment and description of the most relevant threats for CO2 migration 
and leakage. Studies were executed by both TNO and Shell. Although the description of this step is quite short, the 
step itself took the most time and effort in the whole process. To illustrate this; the EIA [ 3 ] reference documents 
consist of more than 1000 pages. 
 
Step 4: Semi quantitative ranking of the threats and leakage scenarios 
The investigated threats and leakage scenarios were discussed in a second workshop and impact and probability was 
assigned to the threats that resulted in low, medium and high risk threats. The threats were mapped in a ‘bow-tie’ 
structure. In summary: the ‘bow-tie’ method is a popular risk management technique, so called because it describes 
the management of risk in the shape of a bow-tie. The method visualizes the linkage between the risks and risk 
controls i.e. the risk management system. The method facilitates also in communicating risk issues to non-specialists 
[ 9 ]. The main elements of the bow-tie method are outlined in Figure 1.  
  
Figure 1 Bow-tie for migration and leakage risk for BRT and BRTZ proposed CO2 storage 
The hazard in this project is: sequestered CO2 under relative buoyant conditions and the top event is the migration of 
CO2 out of the containment of the target storage reservoir. Note that the hazard is NOT ‘CO2 under pressure’ as the 
average field pressure of CO2 during and at the end of the injection period is lower than the water pressure in the 
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surrounding formations. This means that the pressure gradient in our case is pointing towards the reservoir rather 
than outwards as is the case in aquifer storage. 
The leakage scenarios that have been indicated during the workshops for the BRT/BRTZ sequestration project are 
named according to standards described by external literature (e.g. [ 6 ], [ 8 ]). The following scenarios were 
identified for assessment of the risks: 
• Cap rock leakage 
• Fault leakage 
• Spill leakage 
• Well leakage 
 
Step 5: Identification of mitigating measures 
Mitigation measures are defined in this note as ‘measures undertaken to reduce the adverse likelihood and/or impact 
of hazards, environmental degradation and technological hazards’. The words mitigation measures and barriers are 
actually interchangeable in this paper. A mitigation measure is for instance the application of a pan-cake plug to 
prevent migration via the wells after the abandonment process. Also a monitoring plan is an example of a mitigation 
measure because it will allow you to take preventive actions to prevent migration or leakage and limit possible 
effects. Mitigation measures have to be taken for all medium and high leakage risk scenarios and might be needed 
for low risk scenarios. It has also to be shown that for those scenarios the effect of mitigation will reduce the risk to 
a negligible or low ranking and that the risks are ALARP (As Low As Reasonably Practicable).  
 
Step 6: Definition of acceptance criteria en test of the remaining risks against the criteria 
Acceptance criteria have to be defined in cooperation with the stakeholders. Discussions with the stakeholders can 
define or redefine also the quantitative definition of the word “reasonably” in ALARP. At this moment probabilities 
and/or quantities of leakage volumes haven’t been agreed nor defined by the key stakeholder: the government but 
the EIA [ 3 ] was approved by the EIA commission. The project is designed for no leakage at any quantity. As well, 
a lack of clarity on acceptance criteria will also hinder the process of risk communication. 
 
Step 7: Overview of requirements: design, operations, abandonment, monitoring, response preparedness.  
This step relates to the presentation of the final risk management plan in table form for internal process optimisation 
and for communication with the stakeholders. The table shows a clear relation between the leakage scenario risks 
and actions that are required on: 
• Surface and sub-surface design. 
• Operations and planning. 
• Monitoring plan for injection and post-injection phases 
• Abandonment procedures to close out long-term well leakage risks. 
• Response preparedness and mitigation measures 
A part of the table is visualised in Figure 2 and fully documented in [ 4 ]. The main threats, the possible 
consequences, probabilities and monitoring and mitigation actions are presented for the fault leakage scenario valid 
for the injection phase only.  
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Figure 2 Risk management plan for BRT and BRTZ during the injection phase of the project for the fault leakage scenario 
 
Finally, the total consequence and impact per scenario is mapped into a risk matrix that pictures the ranking of the 
risks of the leakage scenarios in one overview that accompanies the tabulated risk management plan (Figure 3). 
There are two criteria that determine the probability of migration out of the containment: Initial integrity, Integrity 
of the system and specific (geological) barriers with respect to migration of CO2 before the actual injection phase. 
The integrity of the storage system is proven by the geological containment of hydrocarbons in BRT and BRTZ. 
Possible gas migration is not spotted on seismic above or near the structures. Still, it might be possible that 
production related activities lead to geomechanical changes in and around the reservoir but above all, wells have 
been drilled that could create a direct leak path to the surface. Safety factor: The safety factor describes the 
‘distance’ before a threshold related to the threat is released. For example the pressure difference between 
operational injection pressure and fracture pressure of the seal can be large or small. If the injection pressure is much 
lower than the fracture pressure of the seal, the safety factor is large for that specific threat. A thick overburden 
containing several reservoirs can also be seen as a large safety factor. The combination of all threat ‘distances’ in the 
scenario defines the final verdict on safety factor. 
The consequences are defined by the expected amount of migration, the possible surfacing of the CO2 (leakage) 
and the vicinity of vulnerable objects. We consider for example the consequence to be low when the CO2 might 
migrate but will be trapped by deep layers or that it can migrate up to the surface in low concentrations without 
doing harm.  
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Figure 3 Risk matrix CO2 storage for the injection phase 
It is important to know what the effect will be of this assessment on the further steps in the risk management 
philosophy. The influence of the risk ranking on the mitigation option (risk treatment) is discussed below. 
Negligible risk scenarios: These risks are indicated by the blue colour in Figure 3. Negligible risks do not require 
further monitoring. Low concentration means that it is within the uncertainty bounds of natural CO2 occurrence and 
cannot be picked up by monitoring tools. 
Low risk scenarios: These risks are indicated by the green colour in Figure 3. A high concentration means a relative 
high CO2 concentration that can be picked by monitoring tools. Low risks implicate the need for monitoring of 
possible migration or the monitoring around vulnerable objects (drinking water, surface monitoring). According to 
the study work performed, BRT-1 and BRT-2b show a low to medium probability for migration out of the 
containment. Mitigation measures like a work-over of the wells lead to a significant reduction (negligible) of the 
risks pointed out by the arrows in Figure 3. Still, it was decided to investigate as well the possible maximum leakage 
flux that could occur via a well. Calculations pointed out that the maximum annual emission from the leakage point 
was still below the annual CO2 emission of a mid-sized car [ 10 ].  
Medium risk scenarios: Medium risks are indicated by the orange colour in Figure 3. Medium risks prescribe the 
monitoring of nearby sensitive objects and the monitoring of the main threats. Monitoring of the migration of CO2 
after the failure of the barrier is prescribed as well. No medium leakage risks have been identified for the BRT and 
BRTZ storage project. 
High risk scenarios: These risks, indicated by the red colour are not accepted within the project. Identified high risks 
need to be closed out by further study work or significantly reduced by mitigation measures. No high leakage risks 
have been identified for the BRT and BRTZ storage project. 
 
Risk Matrix CO2 storage
High
Medium
Low
Negligible
Negligible Low Medium High
Possible Consequences
Probability
CO2 surfaces OR CO2 accumulates in 
shallow (<200m) layers with high concentrations 
AND impacting critical objects
CO2 surfaces OR CO2 accumulates in shallow 
(<200m) layers with:
high concentrat ions AND impacting NO critical objects OR 
low concentrations AND impacting critical objects
CO2 migrates through the seal at high 
concentrations but will be trapped by deep 
(>200m) layers OR migrates to shallow layers or 
surface, but low concentrations and not near 
sensitive objects
-Info on initial integrity (II)
-Safety factors, SF (from study)
Pos evidence II
AND large SF
No Pos evidence II
AND large SF
Pos evidence II
AND no large SF
No Pos evidence II
AND no large SF
CO2 migrates through the seal 
at low concentrations but will be trapped 
by deep (>200m) layers
CL
CS
FL
SL
BRT-1
BRT-2B
Inj.
BRTZ-3
BRT-2A
BRTZ-4(A) 
BRTZ-1
Inj.
CL Cap rock leakage
FL Fault leakage
CS Cap rock seepage
SL Spill leakage
Remaining risk after mitigation
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Step 8: Review of risk management plan 
Review of the plan by independent teams is an important step as the risk management plan impacts the whole 
project structure. Proposed actions by the review teams have to be closed out and endorsed. Endorsement supports 
confidence in the whole project that contributes to debates with the public. For BRT and BRTZ the risk management 
plan was challenged by local, regional and national governmental bodies. The management plan was also reflected 
in the environmental impact assessment (EIA) and challenged and endorsed by the EIA committee.  
 
Step 9: Review & Update scenario sheets at pre-determined milestones and when new monitoring data 
becomes available 
During the execution of the project, the risk management plan has to be reviewed and possibly adapted at predefined 
moments during the operational phases and on the moments that new monitoring data become available. Also this 
step is a standard procedure in the industry. It is foreseen that an independent committee will have access to the 
monitoring data and will have the ability to comment on any deviation from expected behaviour. Predefined 
moments of monitoring and model control are inserted in the operational plans. 
 
Step 10: Risk communication with the stakeholders and the public 
Probably the most important step for the application of a license to operate is the communication of the assessed and 
managed risks to stakeholders and public. The perception of the risks by the public can differ very much from the 
outcome of step 7. It is recommended that communication experts communicate the risk management plan to the 
public and not technical experts. This is only successful when full understanding on the risk management plan exists 
by the communication expert. More information on risk communication and public perception is given in [ 11 ]. 
3. Containment demonstration after abandonment 
The abandonment phase reviews long-term process such as pressure increase by gas mixing and long-term 
geochemical changes (re-mineralization). These threats were investigated using the same step-wise risk 
methodology. Containment after abandonment is demonstrated by the fact that the pressure in the reservoir will 
always be lower than the pore pressure in the rocks around the reservoir. Long-term mineralization will reduce the 
permeability of the seal, making the seal more sealing. To avoid any leakage via wells through buoyant forces, wells 
will be abandoned by using ‘pan-cake’ plugs. In this case steel, cement and some rock will be milled away over 
certain sections and these sections will subsequently be filled with CO2 resistant cement. Soil and groundwater will 
be monitored after abandonment as well as ground movement. The duration of the post abandonment monitoring 
period is to be agreed with the government. 
4. Conclusion 
The risk management plan is designed to demonstrate and ensure permanent and safe containment of the CO2 in 
BRT and BRTZ fields. It pictures the position of all the technical work in a coherent framework. Verdicts on the 
individual threats and leakage scenarios by experts further determine the monitoring and mitigation strategy of the 
BRT and BRTZ development plan, which can be labeled therefore as a risk based. 
The risk management plan shows that: 
• No medium and high leakage scenarios have been identified in both the injection phase and post 
abandonment phase, 
• low risk scenarios in the injection phase were shifted to a negligible to low position by mitigating 
measures, 
• a risk-based monitoring and mitigation plan has been defined, 
• the risk for long-term leakage is negligible, 
• this framework is highly usable for future CO2 storage projects. 
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